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This paper explores a variety of strategies for understanding the formation, structure, efficiency and vulner-
ability of water distribution networks. Water supply systems are studied as spatially organized networks for
which the practical applications of abstract evaluation methods are critically evaluated. Empirical data from
benchmark networks are used to study the interplay between network structure and operational efficiency, re-
liability and robustness. Structural measurements are undertaken to quantify properties such as redundancy
and optimal-connectivity, herein proposed as constraints in network design optimization problems. The role
of the supply-demand structure towards system efficiency is studied and an assessment of the vulnerability to
failures based on the disconnection of nodes from the source(s) is undertaken. The absence of conventional
degree-based hubs (observed through uncorrelated non-heterogeneous sparse topologies) prompts an alterna-
tive approach to studying structural vulnerability based on the identification of network cut-sets and optimal
connectivity invariants. A discussion on the scope, limitations and possible future directions of this research
is provided.
Modern society is highly dependent on the reli-
able performance of critical infrastructures such
as water, energy and transport systems. The in-
creasing level of complexity and interdependence
of such systems poses numerous challenges to re-
liable design and optimal control, hence the need
for such issues to be supported with insights gen-
erated beyond the traditional engineering disci-
plines. This provides an opportunity for com-
plex networks researchers to apply new concepts
and tools to describe, predict and control the
behavior and evolution of critical infrastructure
systems. Water distribution systems, one of the
most important complex infrastructure systems,
can be represented as networks of multiple in-
terconnected interacting parts. This work is a
study of the structure, connectivity and build-
ing blocks of the networks underlying such sys-
tems and identifies the relationship between the
structure of water distribution systems and their
operational reliability and susceptibility to dam-
age. Some important similarities and differences
between water supply systems and other com-
plex infrastructure networks are explained and
the role of the supply-demand structure in the
formation and operation of water distribution sys-
tems has been highlighted.
I. INTRODUCTION
Research in the field of complex networks and their
structural properties has grown rapidly in the past few
years1–6. Complex networks are usually understood as
distributed systems consisting of multiple interconnected
components structured in non-trivial configurations in
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which the network function is largely affected by the
structure7, depending on the organizational complexity
and the level of interaction among the components.
One significant demonstration of such interplay of
the network structure and function is observed in the
study of so-called scale-free networks2, characterized
by heterogeneous structures and non-uniform degree
distributions in which the great majority of the nodes
have very low connectivity and a few nodes, known as
hubs, are highly connected. Scale-free networks reveal
important properties in terms of the level of resilience
(or lack of it) when exposed to errors and attacks; they
are robust against random failures but vulnerable to
targeted attacks on their hubs8.
The ubiquity and importance of complex networks
observed as the underlying structural framework of many
technological, information and social systems has urged
researchers to study the dynamics of network formation
and growth, which in turn has given rise to efforts to
understand the structural vulnerability of networks and
their resilience against perturbations, random failures
and targeted attacks8–12. Due to the increasing level of
complexity and component interdependency in critical
infrastructure networks, several studies have focused on
understanding the security of these networks and their
susceptibility to damage. Examples of infrastructure
networks include urban roads, rail network, power grid,
gas pipeline networks, water distribution networks and
supply chains9,10,13–16. By construction, most of these
networks are spatially organized planar graphs. Such a
property imposes severe limitations on network connec-
tivity and layout, and hence they are studied differently
from other non-technological complex networks17.
Water distribution networks (WDNs) are among such
spatially organized systems in which multiple assets
are connected by actual physical links. In a link-node
representation of physical components in water distribu-
tion networks, pipes and other connections are shown
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2by edges, with the fixed junctions (reservoirs, tanks
and demand points) and pipe intersections represented
by nodes. WDNs are complex in the sense that their
multiple interconnected components are arranged in
non-trivial configurations and interact in complex ways.
Some important contributors to the complexity and
uncertainty in design and operation of WDNs are:
the range of possible combinations of the pipe sizes,
materials and connectivity layouts, location of the valves
and pumping stations, capacity of tanks, control valve
settings, pump scheduling and unknown demand for
water.
The management of WDNs depends on system layout
(topology and patterns of connectivity), design (system
sizing) and system operation (given a design)18. The
optimal design of large water distribution networks
is a complex problem that involves making decisions
on pipe layout and sizes (length and diameter), while
trying to minimize the cost of network design, building
and operation. This problem can be formulated as
the problem of minimizing costs subject to hydraulic
feasibility, satisfaction of demands and meeting pressure
constraints19. Consequently, numerous quantitative
and simulation methods on the least-cost design of
water distribution systems have been developed (see19,20
and references therein). Depending on the size and
complexity of the design problem, these methods employ
techniques such as: linear programming21, non-linear
programming22, integer goal programming23, Monte
Carlo simulation24 and evolutionary methods including
genetic algorithms and ant colony optimization25–27.
In addition to the technical and computational
complexities, there exist important issues during the
design of WDNs such as redundancy (the existence of
alternative resources or supply paths) and reliability (the
probability of non-failure over time). The assessment
of water distribution systems reliability is a daunting
task that largely depends on availability of historical
data for mechanical component failures and hydraulic
failures. Fortunately, water distribution system reli-
ability is largely defined by its network layout (e.g.
redundancy improves reliability)28. However, regardless
of the utilized method, optimization reduces cost by
reducing pipe diameter (i.e. reducing the capacity)
or by completely eliminating the link between nodes
(i.e. eliminating the loops in the network) and hence
reducing redundancy. This, in the absence of suitable
optimization constraints for redundancy and optimal
connectivity, makes the system unreliable and largely
vulnerable to the failures of links and nodes following
errors, attacks and overloads. Consequently, the analysis
of network topology and measurement of the redundancy
and optimal connectivity, to be used in the framework
of optimization design models, could make a significant
contribution to this field.
It is also worth noting that, with more attention
being paid to the development of protective measures
to increase network invulnerability and robustness
during the strategic planning of infrastructure networks,
deterministic methods based on graph invariants or
complex networks can be employed to compare alter-
native designs and assess network efficiency and overall
robustness against failures. Moreover, given recent
developments in the analysis of the structure of techno-
logical and infrastructure networks10,11,13,14,17 and the
similarity among spatially organized complex systems,
the study of the structural vulnerability of WDNs seems
timely and relevant. To the authors’ knowledge, the
application of complex networks approaches in water
supply systems is limited to a study of the small world
phenomena in WDNs29, with no systematic study of
WDN structure and function reported by using complex
networks methodology. This study intends to project
the important findings of network-based approaches to
the analysis of technological systems onto WDNs and
thereby prompt a dialog between theoretical network
scientists on one hand, and engineers and operational
researchers on the other hand. Such a dialog is central
to improving our ability to overcome the numerous
challenges encountered in the design, operation and
protection of complex infrastructure systems.
In this paper, the structural organization of water dis-
tribution systems are studied and compared to similar
types of physical networks reported in the literature.
The assessment is achieved through an analysis of em-
pirical data for four benchmark water distribution net-
works based on measurements that quantify the structure
of the network paths, cycles, connectivity and efficiency.
Moreover, network resilience is studied by examining
two important topological features; robustness and path-
redundancy. Robustness is viewed as the overall struc-
tural tolerance to errors and failures, and redundancy
as the existence of alternative supply paths, usually ob-
served in the form of the loops or equivalent structures
consisting of nodes and standby links or components not
employed to their full capacity. Network robustness is
analyzed by examining the spectra of the connectivity
and Laplacian matrices of the studied WDNs and, par-
ticularly, by evaluating the two descriptive graph invari-
ants of algebraic connectivity and spectral gap, which
quantify static fault tolerance and optimal-connectivity,
respectively. Based on such a viewpoint, the structural
vulnerability of representative WDNs is revealed in terms
of the presence of the bridges and cut sets. Finally, a dis-
cussion on the scope and the limitations of the presented
methodology and possible future directions of this re-
search is presented.
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FIG. 1. The graph representation of the studied water distribution networks; East-Mersea (top-left), Colorado Springs (top-
right), Richmond (bottom-left), Kumasi (bottom-right).
II. WATER DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS
In general, the physical configuration of water dis-
tribution networks is dependent on the geographical
organization of the supply and demand nodes and the
location of physical barriers such as roads, buildings,
rivers and so on. The nodes in a WDN are typically
grouped by sources (e.g. reservoirs, tanks and storage
facilities), control and distribution nodes (e.g. pressure
control valves, pipe junctions, pumps) and demand
nodes or sinks (e.g. consumers). WDN links, on the
other hand are capacitated transmission and distribu-
tion pipes with specified length, size and other physical
attributes. However, the direction of the links in WDNs
is subject to occasional changes (except for the pipes
attached to a source or a sink) due to operational flow
and pressure requirements, considerations related to
the pumping cost and flow redirections that might take
place following the failure of a major supply path.
A comprehensive assessment of WDN resilience should
take into account the non-topological specifications of
the network components including the size of the links
and importance and influence of the nodes. Such an
approach will enable the establishment of realistic
correlations between the topology of the network and
those operational aspects important to the analysis of
reliability and vulnerability, such as the total amount
of lost water and the equivalent hours of disrup-
tion as a result of failures. Achieving this, however,
largely depends on the study of the flow dynamics
throughout the network and the analysis of empirical
pressure and flow data (not available here) followed
by extensive simulations (computationally costly) in
order to establish and validate the described correlations.
Therefore, in this contribution the studied networks
are treated as undirected graphs, and a simplified
approach is adopted which is based on the statistical
properties of network topology and applications of graph
theory to identify the structural patterns and building
blocks of the networks. Such an approach provides
a conceptual study framework and establishes some
necessary but perhaps insufficient conditions to fully
assess network vulnerability. Meanwhile, it is worth
mentioning that these networks are normally regarded
as connected graphs in the sense that, under normal
operational circumstances, there exists at least one path
between every two nodes and in particular between
the water supply sources (e.g. reservoirs, tanks) and
the consumers. Consequently, great emphasis has been
placed here on graph connectivity and the ways to
preserve and improve it, as any disconnection between
the source and the consumers is regarded as a failure.
In this work, four benchmark real distribution net-
works are studied (see Fig. 1), each representing different
formation and organizational patterns. East-Mersea
4is a small distribution sub-network owned by Anglian
Water Services in the UK. The Colorado Springs
network reported in30 and the Kumasi town water
distribution network in Ghana in Africa are examples of
networks with multiple water supply sources. Finally,
the Richmond network is a sub-network of the Yorkshire
Water system in the UK with one single reservoir as
reported in31. Due to the technical difficulties and high
expenses associated with obtaining the data on WDN
components that are located underground, datasets on
WDNs are not widely available for this type of analysis
and consequently the studied datasets represent a small
sample of the existing set of water supply systems.
As is common to the representation of WDNs, reser-
voirs, tanks, control valves, pipe junctions, pumps and
demand nodes are represented by nodes and transmis-
sion and distribution pipes are regarded as graph links.
The studied networks seem to have formed during un-
controlled gradual expansion over time. While Colorado
Springs is significantly more looped-like than Richmond
and its structure is somewhat ordered as a lattice, at least
locally, it cannot be definitely stated whether its global
ordering has been obtained as result of a single optimized
construction plan. The irregularity in structure is much
more visible in the Richmond example where the network
layout largely deviates from the lattices. This structural
property of WDNs may be interpreted as local robustness
at the expense of global robustness32.
III. STRUCTURAL MEASUREMENTS
Each network is modeled as a mathematical graph
G = G(N,E) in which N is the set of n graph nodes
and E is the set of m graph edges. Link density for an
undirected network is given by q = 2mn(n−1) , the fraction
between the total and the maximum possible links to
indicate the sparseness or dense-connectivity of network
layout. The four studied WDNs are sparse, in the sense
that the number of graph links is far from maximal, as
observed by low link density values (Table I). A graph
is planar if it can be embedded in the plane so that
its edges intersect only at a node mutually incident
with them. While it may not be possible to prove the
strict planarity of the studied WDNs (for example by
using Kuratowski’s characterization theorem33), only a
negligible percentage of the edge intersections do not
match to their endpoints and hence the studied networks
are near-planar, similar to other spatially organized
infrastructure networks11,14,17. This is not surprising
given the fact that in the design of water distribution
systems, it is not very common or even feasible to lay
transmission or distribution pipes (elevated or otherwise)
in multiple layers on top of each other and hence a
typical water distribution network is usually organized
in a single-layer almost planar structure.
One simple way to determine the overall similarity to
or alternatively the deviation of the network structures
from tree-like or mesh graphs is to evaluate the link-per-
node ratio e = mn or the average number of connections
per node or mean node-degree < k > related by the
equation e = mn . The link per node ratios for spatially
organized networks including the studied WDNs lay be-
tween the two limits of e = 1 and e = 2 which represent
tree-like planar graphs and two-dimensional (infinite)
regular lattices, respectively. In general, the grid-like
structures facilitate equalized distribution of flow and
pressure under varying demand rates and locations in
WDNs, and hence this simple metric may illustrate
the hydraulic efficiency of the network to a limited extent.
Another metric used to describe the structural or-
ganization of WDNs is the central-point dominance c′b
defined in34, which, in the analysis of flow networks,
may be used to indicate how network flow is controlled
by centrally located point(s), or to quantify the degree
of concentration of the network layout around a cen-
ter. Central-point dominance is calculated by taking
the mean over the betweenness centrality values of all
nodes indexed by the maximum value of betweenness
(achieved at the most central point). This is formu-
lated as c′b =
1
n−1Σi(bmax − bi) where n is the number
of nodes, bi is the betweenness centrality of the node i
and bmax is the maximum betweenness centrality value.
The node betweenness centrality is defined34 as the num-
ber of shortest geodesic paths between two given vertices
that pass through that node divided by the total number
of shortest geodesic paths between those two vertices.
Larger values of betweenness centrality indicate that a
node (edge) is located on many short paths. It is eas-
ily verified that c′b = 1 for wheel or star-like graphs and
c′b = 0 for regular networks with all points having equal
betweenness centralities. Interpretation of the central-
point dominance largely depends on a network’s specific
function and the underlying design considerations. While
construction of star-shaped topologies by locating a hub
at the center will be more economic and may facilitate
transportation in the network, it will significantly com-
promise network robustness due to the high sensitivity
of such network design to the failure of the most cen-
tral point. In WDN design, highly centralized structures
rarely exist, since distributed and grid-like structures are
preferred, as discussed earlier.
The metrics introduced so far, only capture very
generic information regarding the structure of the studied
WDNs which are planar and spatially organized networks
with connectivity restrictions. Extending the analysis to
include other structural properties such as the structure
and number of cycles and loops as an indicator of network
redundancy (regarded as an important criterion for reli-
ability and invulnerability in the context of network de-
sign) adds an important dimension to the assessment. To
this end, the clustering coefficient is a useful measure to
5TABLE I. Graph attributes and measurements for the benchmark water networks (n = nodes, m = links, q = link density, e =
link per node ratio, < k > = average node-degree, kmax = maximum node-degree, c
′
b= central-point dominance, c = clustering
coefficient, rm = meshed-ness)
Network n m q e < k > kmax c
′
b c rm
East-Mersea 755 769 2.70× 10−3 1.01 2.04 4 3.6× 10−1 0.00 9.97× 10−3
Colorado Springs 1786 1994 1.25× 10−3 1.11 2.23 4 4.2× 10−1 8.82× 10−4 5.86× 10−2
Kumasi 2799 3065 7.83× 10−4 1.10 2.19 4 4.5× 10−1 1.54× 10−2 4.77× 10−2
Richmond 872 957 2.52× 10−3 1.09 2.19 4 5.6× 10−1 4.02× 10−2 4.95× 10−2
characterize the status of network loops of length three,
which in this context may be regarded as an indicator of
path redundancy and a way to quantify the existence of
the looped alternative supply routes which ensure flow
between water supply sources and demand points where
the direct link or shortest path between these two nodes
fails. The network’s clustering coefficient is (transitivity)
defined by
c =
3N∆
N3
(1)
and measures the density of transitive triangles in a
network, where N∆ is the number of triangles and N3
is the number of connected network triples. However,
one major difficulty associated with the use of the
clustering coefficient for the study of cycles in spatially
organized urban networks is that the dominant looped
structures in such networks are non-triangular and
mostly quadrilateral11,35. Therefore, the clustering
coefficient is not a particularly good indicator of path
redundancy in such networks and hence a more general
measurement is required to overcome this difficulty.
One recently proposed metric to quantify the density
of the cycles and loops in planar graphs is known as the
meshed-ness coefficient11 and is more relevant in this re-
spect. In the design of water distribution networks, rep-
resented as a graph with n nodes and m edges, the num-
ber of independent loops is given by f = m − n + 1 for
single source networks and by f = m − n for multiple
source systems36, derived from Euler’s formula to count
the (finite) faces associated with any planar graph. The
maximum number of links cannot exceed 3n − 6 in pla-
nar graphs. Consequently, the meshed-ness coefficient rm
can be defined as the fraction between the actual num-
ber of loops and the maximum possible number of loops
(bounded by 2n− 5)
rm =
f
2n− 5 (2)
which quantifies the density of any kind of loops (not
necessarily of triangular) and may be regarded as a sur-
rogate measure of path redundancy in the network. The
numerical values of the measurements discussed above as
calculated for the studied networks are presented in Ta-
 
FIG. 2. Degree distribution and correlation properties of net-
works; Richmond (red triangles), Colorado Springs (black dia-
monds), East-Mersea (blue stars) and Kumasi (green crosses)
(a) Log-linear cumulative degree distribution plot of the stud-
ied networks showing a sharp drop from k = 3 (b) Nearest
neighbor degree correlation kn,n(k).
ble (I).
As suggested, planarity and other physical specifi-
cations impose severe limitations on the connectivity
of WDNs. This is witnessed through the sparseness
(low link-density values) of the studied networks and
a relatively uniform degree distribution with small
differences between the maximum and minimum node
6degree in these networks. The degree distributions of all
four WDNs, illustrated in Fig. 2(a), have a maximum
of four connections and a minimum of one connection
per node, with the biggest percentage of nodes having
degrees three (48.2% for Colorado Springs, 50.7% for
Kumasi and 39.5% for Richmond) and two (50.6% for
East-Mersea), respectively. By using the inequality
< k >= 2mn ≤ 2(3n−6)n for planar graphs, it can be seen
that the average node degree is strictly smaller than
6, whereas the average degree distributions obtained
in both cases are much lower than this theoretical
maximum.
The studied examples are found to be single-scaled
non-heterogeneous networks (Fig. 2(a)) in which the cu-
mulative probability degree distributions can be approxi-
mated by the exponential form Px>k(k) =
∫∞
x
P (k) dk ≈
exp(−kγ ). The exponents are found as γ = 1.71 for East-
Mersea (r2 = 0.901), γ = 2.10 for Colorado Springs (r2 =
0.877), γ = 2.01 for Kumasi (r2 = 0.872), and γ = 1.98
for Richmond (r2 = 0.892). These numbers are generally
in the same range as those similarly reported for other
spatially organized infrastructure networks11,15,16,37, in
spite of the presumed approximation error due to the
curve fitting based on four sample points only. The ex-
istence of degree correlation38 among vertices is calcu-
lated by kn,n(k) = Σk′p(k
′k) which is the average near-
est neighbor degree of a vertex of degree k, where p(k′k)
is the conditional probability that an edge belonging to
a node of degree k points to a node of degree k. The
relationship between the nodes of a given degree k and
the degree of the nearest neighboring nodes, illustrated
in Fig. 2(b), does not show any increasing or decreasing
trend in any of the four networks. Based on these obser-
vations (i.e. relatively uniform degree distribution and
the absence of highly connected nodes), no assortative
or disassortative connectivity by node degree has been
detected and hence the studied networks are observed to
be uncorrelated.
IV. PATH LENGTH AND EFFICIENCY
Accessibility is determined by the level of ease or
difficulty associated with dispatching a commodity
or service throughout the network, or gaining access
to and from different points across the network. In
general, the analysis of the shortest distances between all
pairs of nodes and the distribution of the path lengths
may reveal important information about the levels of
efficiency and accessibility in a network and will be
partially correlated with reliability in terms of meeting
the objectives of the system. In WDNs, this matter
is worth examining due to the benefits that a well-
conceived optimally-connected network layout might
bring in terms of better reachability between sources
and consumers, the quality of the service provided
(water quality, quantity and pressure) and the efficient
management of resources by suppliers (reduction in the
financial, energy and other costs associated with network
design, maintenance and operation). Water distribution
infrastructures are spatial networks organized against
the Euclidean plane with their components occupying
actual physical locations. Two basic measures to inform
the level of accessibility and efficiency in such networks
are Euclidean distances between nodes and geodesic
path lengths.
Specific to WDNs is the concept of hydraulic head
(i.e. conservation of energy) on which the efficient
cost-effective operation of pressurized WDNs largely de-
pends. Opposite to the notion of conservation of energy
in WDNs is the concept of energy losses observed as: (i)
major losses due to pipe wall frictions, and (ii) minor
losses due to turbulence and changes in streamlines
through fittings and junctions19. The Darcy-Weisbach
equation for pressure loss due to friction along a given
length of pipe between two nodes i and j is given by
∆p = f
Lij
Dij
ρV 2
2 where f is the pipe friction factor, Lij
is the pipe length, Dij is the pipe diameter, ρ is the
density of the fluid and V is the average velocity of
the fluid flow. Consequently, it is observed that the
hydraulic efficiency at the pipe level and across the
network, among other factors, depends on the pipe
lengths, where larger diameter short pipes have smaller
energy losses. The minor losses, on the other hand,
occur at fittings and junctions whereas a smaller number
of such fittings potentially means smaller number of
medium junctions between two nodes and hence smaller
path lengths. In practice, minor losses are sometimes
accounted for by the equivalent pipe length method19.
With these simplifications, we relate the hydraulic
efficiency of water supply systems to the patterns of
distribution of Euclidean pipe lengths, and to some
extent the distribution of geodesic path lengths of the
underlying network.
The local structural organization of WDNs and the
distribution of edge lengths can be viewed as a replica of
the local urban structure, but also as an indication of the
preferred actions taken by suppliers to reduce the con-
struction and supply costs and to minimize energy losses.
Therefore, in a typical WDN it is expected that short
and medium size supply pipes at denser grid-like core
sub-networks near the city centers or urban areas will
predominate, with very few long distance pipes to carry
water from the suburban sources and reservoirs. Study-
ing the (cumulative) distribution of the edge lengths for
the benchmark WDNs confirms this proposition, as illus-
trated in Fig. 3(a). The shortest geodesic path length
dij between two nodes i and j in an undirected connected
graph is the minimum number of edges traversed in or-
der to reach node j from node i. Graph diameter d is
the maximum graph eccentricity defined as the maxi-
mum value of such shortest paths. The characteristic
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FIG. 3. Distribution of (a) the Euclidean edge lengths, and
(b) geodesic distances for Richmond (red triangles), Colorado
Springs (black diamonds), East-Mersea (blue stars) and Ku-
masi (green crosses).
path length l is defined as the average of the shortest
path lengths
l =
1
n(n− 1)Σ(i 6=j)dij (3)
which represents the average degree of separation
between all graph nodes. The (cumulative) distribution
of the geodesic distances for the studied networks
is shown in Fig. 3(b), with the values for average
pipe length, mean geodesic path length and network
diameters provided in Table (II). In this sense, the
studied structures deviate significantly from small world
networks, despite the prevalence of the short (in terms
of Euclidean distances) edges, where near-planarity of
the networks is perceived to be the reason39.
The largest deviation from an efficient small world
structure (illustrated by largest Euclidean as well as
geodesic path length) has been observed in the Rich-
mond network, probably due to geographical spread of
the network combined with largely irregular non-mesh
structure. Colorado Springs on the other hand is a
TABLE II. Path length and efficiency measures (d= diameter,
l = characteristic path length, al= average pipe length(m), g
= route factor)
Network d l al g
East-Mersea 97 34.48 27.52 1.54
Colorado Springs 69 25.94 187.12 1.45
Kumasi 120 33.89 316.20 1.46
Richmond 135 51.44 633.09 1.67
smaller world than the others (as evidenced through
a smaller graph diameter, shorter characteristic path
lengths). This, viewed in line with the local meshed
structure and the presence of mostly short and medium
size pipes, indicates properties of more equalized dis-
tribution of pressure and flow across the system and
overall operational and hydraulic efficiency.
One of the most important objectives in the opera-
tion of WDNs is to maintain the path connectivity be-
tween the source(s) and the consumers (network nodes)
and make such path connectivity as short and efficient
as possible. Therefore, instead of assessing the efficiency
based on the connectivity between all pairs of nodes, it
is more appropriate to measure the efficiency based on
the connectivity between a root node such as a reservoir
and other nodes in the network. One such measurement
is known as the network’s route factor40 and defined as
g =
1
(n− 1)Σ
n−1
i=1
s,i
δs,i
(4)
where s,i is the combined (Euclidean) distance along the
edges connecting node i to the source s, and δs,i is the
direct Euclidean distance. The smallest possible value of
the route factor is 1 which is characteristic of a star graph
(with all its nodes directly connected to the source), re-
garded as the optimal network in the sense that it has
short and efficient paths to the source. A greater value of
the route factor means greater deviation from the opti-
mal network structure and hence greater costs and effort
required to construct and operate the network, dispatch
the utility across or navigate through different routes.
The route factor measurements for the studied networks
are presented in Table (II). The range of values obtained
for the route factors are similar to those reported by
Gastner and Newman41 for other types of spatial distri-
bution networks (such as g = 1.13 for the western Aus-
tralian gas pipelines and g = 1.59 the sewer system).
Authors of41 discuss that real world networks ”appear
to find a remarkably good compromise” between the two
extreme models of star graph (optimal in the sense of
having short, efficient paths to the root) and minimum
spanning tree (optimal in the sense of having minimum
total edge length). With the route factors close to one,
studied WDNs are remarkably efficient in this sense, de-
spite the lack of a central plan to improve global effi-
8ciency, due to contemporary planning and management
strategies that seek to optimize local network robustness,
reliability and efficiency as suggested elsewhere32. In this
study, the value of the route factor for networks with
multiple reservoirs (i.e. multiple root nodes) has been
obtained by taking the average over the individual route
factors for each water supply source in the network. In
the calculation of the route factors, only reservoirs and
large volume water supply sources are regarded as root
nodes.
V. ROBUSTNESS AND STRUCTURAL
VULNERABILITY OF WATER DISTRIBUTION
NETWORKS
The analysis of structural vulnerability is carried
out by studying the network topology and connectivity
configurations and monitoring the changes in system
functionality following perturbations such as single or
multiple component removals as a result of either ran-
dom failures or targeted attacks. This entails measuring
important operational indicators such as diameter,
efficiency and local or large scale connectivity for the
initial network and for the network post-intervention.
The use of alternatives to connectivity measures as a way
of indicating network vulnerability was first proposed by
Bolloba´s42 in the context of communication networks.
The work considered connectivity optimization problems
with respect to changes in network diameter due to link
or node failures. Alternatively, one could use a statistical
approach to assess network robustness8 by measuring
the fraction of the nodes (edges) to be removed before
complete defragmentation (large scale disconnection)
happens. Such measurements of network robustness have
been exercised by performing random failure scenarios
or attack simulations based on deletion in decreasing
order of the most central or most connected nodes/links.
Such studies have found that certain network topologies
(e.g. scale-free networks) are extremely vulnerable to
targeted attacks on their hubs8.
In general, network topologies are similar to one of
the groups of: centralized (e.g. wheel or star-like),
decentralized (e.g. hub-spoke) or distributed structures,
depending on the formation processes and organizational
hierarchy of network components. Usually, centralized
or hub-spoke structures provide greater operational
efficiency and reliability, but also higher vulnerabil-
ity to targeted attacks on their hubs8. However, as
discussed earlier, WDNs are spatially organized ho-
mogeneous networks with no pronounced hubs and
generally structured in a distributed fashion. In other
words, non power law random distribution of the
node degrees implies that most of the nodes and links
have comparable importance from the point of view
of degree-based random failures or targeted attack
strategies, and consequently no avalanche breakdown
may happen following the removal of such components43.
The threshold for random removal of nodes for any
degree distribution44 is given by
fc = 1− 1<k2>
<k> − 1
(5)
which provides a theoretical value for the critical fraction
of the nodes which need to be removed for a network to
lose its large scale connectivity (i.e. complete destruction
of the largest cluster). Using this analytical formula
for the studied WDNs, it is found that: fc = 0.42 for
Colorado Springs, fc = 0.37 for Kumasi, fc = 0.32 for
Richmond and fc = 0.22 for East-Mersea. In other
words, a complete disintegration of Colorado Springs
takes the removal of about 42 percent of its nodes
and the adjacent connections while, by removal of 38
percent of the nodes Kumasi will become completely
disintegrated and so on. The above discussion is of
some practical value only if the vulnerability is consid-
ered when WDNs are exposed to extreme events and
catastrophes. However, other structural vulnerability
measurements may reveal important or even more useful
information on the current structure of WDNs and
enable the comparative study of structural vulnerability.
The most important operational objective of WDNs
is to supply clean water from the source to consumers
with sufficient quantity and pressure and there seems
to be a strong relationship between the type and the
location of failures and the network’s capability to meet
its objectives. Whilst the operational consequences of
the failure of certain WDN components may be tolerated
by using redundant appurtenances and re-routing the
flow, the removal of even a tiny percentage of the nodes
or links (e.g. those directly connected to water supply
sources) may completely disrupt network operation.
Consequently, WDNs can be regarded as extremely
vulnerable to the removal of certain nodes such as the
reservoirs and water supply sources and their adjacent
links. In other words, the hubs in WDNs should be
seen as not necessarily the highly connected or the most
central components; but they are rather the most influ-
ential ones (such as the source nodes and their adjacent
nodes and links) or the components most critical to
the satisfaction of specific network objectives (such as
the nodes and links whose failures may disconnect the
source from a large part of the network).
To this end, the structural vulnerability and robust-
ness of a WDN may be investigated by quantifying
the level of optimal-connectivity of network design,
by identifying critical locations and the most influ-
ential components followed by studying their failure
consequences on network performance. One way to
identify the critical locations in WDNs is by detecting
the cut-sets i.e. the sets of components whose removal
results in disconnection. More specifically, a node
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FIG. 4. A highlighted cut-set in the Colorado Springs net-
work consisting of three bridges whose simultaneous removal
creates disconnection between the water supply sources (black
rectangles) and a large fragment of the network.
cut-set (edge cut-set, respectively) is a set of nodes
(edges, respectively) whose removal disconnects a spec-
ified pair of nodes33. A single element node cut-set is
called an articulation point and a single edge cut-set
is called a bridge (Fig. 4). The node-connectivity
(edge-connectivity) is the smallest number of nodes
(edges) whose removal disconnects the network (or in
case of disconnected networks it increases the number
of connected components). These metrics can also be
viewed as simple robustness indicators which quantify
the minimum number of attacks or failures required to
render a group of the nodes disconnected. In the studied
WDNs however, these measurements become trivially
equal to one, due to the sparse structure of networks
and the fact that most of the end-users are supplied by
single connections only. Therefore, it would be necessary
to employ other measurements to differentiate between
structural vulnerability and fault-tolerance of these
networks.
Here, such measurement has been carried out by
studying the spectrum of the network adjacency ma-
trices of studied networks. Two such measurements
utilized here are algebraic connectivity and spectral gap,
network properties that quantify the robustness and
optimal connectivity of sparse networks, independent
from the network size or drawing. Algebraic connectivity
λ2 first introduced in
45 and extensively discussed in46,47
is defined as the second smallest eigenvalue of the nor-
malized Laplacian matrix of a network. The Laplacian
matrix of G with n nodes is a n × n matrix L = D − A
where D = diag(di) and di is the degree of node i and
A = (aij) is the adjacency matrix of G where aij = 1
if there is a link between nodes i and j , and aij = 0
TABLE III. Spectral and global measurements for the bench-
mark water networks (λ2 = algebraic connectivity, ∆= spec-
tral gap, fc = critical ratio of defragmentation)
Network λ2 ∆ fc
East-Mersea 1.97× 10−4 3.91× 10−2 0.22
Colorado Springs 2.43× 10−4 2.83× 10−2 0.42
Kumasi 9.40× 10−5 9.08× 10−3 0.37
Richmond 6.09× 10−5 7.27× 10−2 0.32
otherwise. The smallest eigenvalue of a Laplacian matrix
is zero with its multiplicity equal to the number of a
network’s connected components. Algebraic connectivity
is a positive value whose magnitude indicates network
robustness and well-connectedness. Larger values of al-
gebraic connectivity represent higher robustness against
efforts to decouple parts of the network. Spectral gap ∆
is the difference between the first and second eigenvalues
of the adjacency matrix A.
A sufficiently large value of spectral gap is regarded
as a necessary condition for the so-called ”good expan-
sion” properties12 and the relative similarity between the
network structure and a family of optimally-connected
sparse regular networks known as ”expanders”48. The
lack of good expansion, represented by small spectral
gap, is usually observed through simultaneous low con-
nectivity, sparseness and the presence of bridges and ar-
ticulation points whose removal results in the split of the
network into two or more large fragments. On the other
hand, the existence of good expansion together with uni-
form degree distribution, results in higher structural ro-
bustness against node and link failures. A summary of
the evaluated vulnerability measurements is presented in
Table (III). It should be noted that while the obtained
values for algebraic connectivity are typically very low
(mainly due to the discussed planarity and lack of intents
to optimize global invulnerability), they provide a useful
general way of comparing network robustness against the
removal of nodes and links following failures or targeted
attacks.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a complex network approach was
adopted to studying the structure and vulnerability of
water distribution networks. Water distribution net-
works are viewed as complex networks represented by
link node graphs of interconnected interacting compo-
nents. Several measurements were undertaken to quan-
tify the network structure and explain its relationship
with the hierarchy, evolution, performance reliability and
the vulnerability of these networks. The common charac-
teristics of water distribution networks and other types of
spatially organized networks were highlighted and their
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different features explored. A summary of the reported
observations are as follows:
(I) The studied water distribution networks are sparse
near-planar graphs whose structures largely resemble the
surrounding urban areas supplied by the system. The
ordering structure of these networks represents a gradual
and usually unplanned expansion over time as a result
of the urban dwelling developments. The planarity and
other geographical characteristics prevent the formation
of highly connected hubs and hence water distribution
networks tend to be non-heterogeneous structures with
typically low connectivity.
(II) Clustering and looped or grid-like structures take
place at the distribution levels in the town centers and
urban areas with higher population density and greater
demand for water. Reliability and efficiency considera-
tions give rise to the observation of greater link density
and higher path redundancy provided by mostly short
and small pipes in such places as compared to the sparse
structure of network formed by long and larger pipes at
the suburbs and transmission levels of the network. Net-
work loops are mostly non-triangular which resulted in
small values of clustering coefficient. The meshed-ness
coefficient is found to be a better indicator of the status
of network loops and cycles and hence a better descriptor
of path redundancy.
(III) The formation, design and construction of WDNs
are largely influenced by the cost of connections and
pumping water from the sources to demand points, sub-
ject to geographical specifications. Consequently, the
metric known as route factor, which is based on the Eu-
clidean distances between the water supply source and
demand nodes, is regarded as a more realistic indicator
of network efficiency in addition to a surrogate measure
of the construction costs, as compared to the topologi-
cal measurement of efficiency. In this sense, studied wa-
ter distribution networks show high efficiency similar to
other types of reported distribution networks.
(IV) Network robustness and structural vulnerability
were investigated by using techniques to identify the
influential components and critical locations (e.g. articu-
lation points and bridges) and quantifying the network’s
well-connectedness with respect to the existence of
such locations, in the absence of degree-based hubs
and given the sparse structure of networks. Descriptive
measurements, including those derived from the spectral
analysis of network connectivity and Laplacian matrices,
quantified the level of structural network tolerance
against failures and removal of components and enabled
a basic comparison between different network designs.
Overall, these observations provide a framework for
the study of water distribution systems and the level
of similarity or difference between water distribution
networks and other types of (spatial) network, in terms
of their structure, organization, efficiency and vulnera-
bility. While, as demonstrated, using mainly topological
network techniques and measurements presents answers
to several basic yet important questions regarding the
structure and function of water distribution networks, a
thorough assessment of system complexity, efficiency and
vulnerability will require further information and speci-
fications relating to the system and its operational status.
To this end, it is very important that a realistic
assessment of the network structure, efficiency or
vulnerability should avoid attempting an exclusive
characterization of network structure or function by
using only single (or even a few) network measurements
as ultimate indicators. Moreover, analyses based on
structural measurements should be accompanied by
relevant heuristics and expert interpretations so that
necessary modifications in assessment criteria and
measurements can be considered. In this respect, the
current analysis may be regarded as a demonstration
that pure network measurements may set up some very
useful and necessary but perhaps insufficient criteria for
the analysis of structural reliability or vulnerability of
water distribution systems and other similar spatially
organized systems. Possible future work in this area may
investigate issues such as network expansion strategies
and trade-off scenarios of optimizing network connectiv-
ity as a function of construction costs and improvement
in serviceability indicators.
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